Pirate Sites’ Domain Hopping Habit Undermines Belgium’s New Blocking Order
The article examines how Belgium’s latest pirate site-blocking order is being undermined by the rapid “domain hopping” practices of piracy websites. Although Belgian authorities recently expanded the national blocking regime by adding 113 new domain names, many of the targeted sites had already migrated to alternative domains before the order was implemented, reducing the practical impact of the enforcement action.
Belgium’s anti-piracy framework, introduced in 2025, relies on a two-step process. First, a court determines that websites are infringing copyright. Then the Belgian Anti-Piracy Office (BAPO) issues an implementation order requiring major internet service providers to block access. The latest order, issued by the French-speaking Business Court of Brussels on 3 July, increased the official blocklist to more than 1,000 domains by adding 113 additional domain names.
Most of the newly blocked domains were linked to well-known French-language piracy portals, particularly Zone-Telechargement and Wawacity, along with sites such as LookMovie, Movix and KissKH. The order requires Belgium’s five largest ISPs, including Proximus, Telenet, Orange Belgium, Mobile Vikings and DIGI Communications, to block access to these domains. Unlike some earlier Belgian orders, however, this one does not require third-party DNS resolvers to implement the blocks, limiting the scope of the injunction.
The article argues that the effectiveness of these blocking measures is weakened because pirate operators routinely register replacement domains long before enforcement takes effect. Visitors attempting to access blocked sites are quickly redirected through search engines, social media, mirrors or newly registered domains. As a result, by the time a court order is enforced, many users have already migrated to the latest working addresses, creating an ongoing cat-and-mouse cycle between rights holders and piracy operators.
TorrentFreak notes that the Belgian system has become increasingly efficient at expanding its blocklist, but questions whether continually adding new domains can keep pace with pirate sites that are designed to switch identities almost instantly. The article suggests that while blocking can reduce casual access to piracy, it is less successful against well-established operators that have automated mechanisms for domain rotation.
The article concludes that Belgium’s experience illustrates both the strengths and limitations of modern site-blocking regimes. Although authorities can rapidly expand court-ordered blocklists and disrupt access to infringing websites, the widespread use of domain hopping means that long-term effectiveness depends on broader enforcement strategies targeting the infrastructure and operators behind pirate services, rather than simply blocking successive domain names.
